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Abstract
Many instance of social interaction display either or both of the following well documented
phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). They also tend to
treat others of shared social identity more favorably (in-group bias). While both phenomena
involve some degree of discrimination towards others, a systematic study of their relations
and interplay is yet missing. In this paper we report the findings of an experiment designed
to address this issue. Participants are exogenously and randomly assigned to one of two
groups. Subsequently they play a sequence of eight games with either an in-group or an
out-group member. In treatment EXO in- and out-group matches are formed exogenously,
while in ENDO participants can choose between in- and out-group matches. We find strong
evidence of in-group bias in EXO, and strong evidence of homophily in ENDO. In-group
biases, however, either decrease or disappear altogether under endogenous matching. We
show that self selection of homophilous agents into in-group matches cannot explain this
fact. We also find that homophily is strongly correlated with risk aversion, and we build on
this evidence to derive a rationale for both the existence of homophily and the disappearance
of in-group biases under endogenous matching.
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1 Introduction
Socio-economic discrimination refers to the widespread influence of various dimensions of peo-
ple’s identity on their choices and socio-economic opportunities. Depending on the context,
discrimination may affect either the formation of social contacts, or the way in which people
treat their counterparts in economic transactions, or both. Homophily - the tendency of people
to interact with similar others - is a well documented feature of most social networks, and is
present along many dimensions of similarity (such as ethnicity, gender, religious views,...) and
typologies of social ties (from the intimate relations of friendship and marriage to business collab-
orations and everyday interactions). In-group bias - the tendency to treat others more favorably
if they are perceived to belong to the same group - has been well documented in social identity
research both in Social Psychology and more recently in Economics. Both phenomena have im-
portant welfare consequences, and the range of related policy issues include the discussion about
“parallel societies”, (sex-) segregated education, the costs and benefits of cultural diversity, the
management of ethnic conflicts and the design of fair and efficient matching institutions among
many others.
Despite the fact that both homophily and in-group bias reflect some degree of discrimination
towards others, a systematic joint analysis of these phenomena and of their interplay is yet
missing. The segregation of social contacts implied by homophily may both affect and be
affected by discrimination in economic transactions. Homophily might for example originate
from a rational reaction to the expectation of preferential treatment from the opponent, i.e. to
the anticipation of in-group biases. Hence homophily might be a consequence of in-group biases.
On the other hand, by affecting the patterns of interaction in favour of homogeneous contacts,
homophily may also affect agents’ behaviour and in-group bias.
In this paper we study homophily and in-group bias in a controlled laboratory experiment.
Participants are randomly assigned to one of two groups, called the RED group and the BLUE
group, with no further identity enhancing activity. We adopt, hence, what is called the “near-
minimal” group design paradigm (see Tajfel and Turner (1979) and the literature cited below).
Choosing such arbitrary assignment to minimal groups reduces the possibility that stereotypes or
prejudices participants may have about specific identities, such as gender, ethnicity or religion
are triggered in the experiment. Everything participants know about the participant(s) they
interact with in the experiment is whether s/he is from the RED or BLUE group.
Most of our results come from the analysis of two treatments, that differ in the adopted
matching institution: EXO, in which participants are matched according to a color-blind uniform
random process, and ENDO, in which participants are allowed to affect their probability of being
matched with RED and BLUE types (see below for details). After matching has occurred, in
both EXO and ENDO participants play a series of 8 games designed to elicit their degree of
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altruism, positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity.1
In treatment ENDO homophily is measured by the willingness of participants to be matched
with opponents from the same RED/BLUE group. We elicit two measures of homophily. First
we ask for a (non-incentivized) expression of preference for a RED or BLUE match. Second, we
elicit participants’ willingness to pay (wtp) for an in-group (or out-group) match.2 Participants
are then matched according to their wtp, such that agents with a higher wtp for an in-group (out-
group) match are more likely to be matched with in-group (out-group) opponents. Afterwards
we let participants play the 8 games.
We find evidence of pervasive homophily even in our minimal setting. About 45 percent of
participants in treatment ENDO indicate a strictly positive wtp for an in-group match and 70
percent indicate a (weak) preference for an in-group match. We also record significant in-group
bias in the EXO treatment. Participants are about 34% more likely to reward an in-group
match, but 39% less likely to punish an in-group match compared to out-group matches.
However, while we find substantial in-group biases in EXO, in-group biases either decrease
or vanish altogether in the ENDO treatment. More precisely, while in EXO participants are 34%
more likely to act positively reciprocal and 39% less likely to act negatively reciprocal in in-group
matches compared to out-group matches, there is no statistically significant difference between
the two in ENDO. This evidence leads to a first key insight: to the extent that participants’
expectations are correct, homophily cannot stem from strategic anticipation of in-group bias.
This is also confirmed by a comparison of levels of homophily in ENDO with two benchmark
treatments, one with no scope for in-group bias and a second with substantial scope for in-group
bias. We find no significant difference with the first, and significantly lower levels of homophily
in ENDO compared to the second.
The substantial reduction of in-group bias in the ENDO treatment provides a second insight:
the nature of the matching institution affects the degree of discrimination in economic trans-
actions. In particular, when homophily is allowed to shape the patterns of social interaction,
less in-group bias (on average) obtains as a result. We show that self-selection of homophilous
agents into in-group matches cannot, by itself, explain the observed decrease from EXO to
ENDO. Some shift in behavior must have therefore occurred in response to the change in the
matching institution. Somewhat surprisingly, all this suggests that while homophily does not
result from expected in-group bias, the amount of realised in-group bias depends on whether
homophily has a “playing field”.
But if not the expectation of preferential treatment, what causes homophily in our experi-
ment? One possible clue might lie in the evidence we gathered in our post-play questionnaire on
risk attitudes, cognitive abilities, gender, age and nationality. In particular we found that ho-
1We use variants of some of the games described in Charness and Rabin (2002).
2In the experiment we never use the terms in-group or out-group, but only RED and BLUE group.
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mophily is positively correlated with a (non-incentivized) measure of risk aversion, but not with
any of the other measures elicited. In an online questionnaire posted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk we then reproduced this finding. Respondents who are less willing to take risks tend to be
more homophilous. These findings echo recent sociological theories, which interpret homophily
as a way to reduce subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2000).3
There is a final, somewhat provoking, message coming out of our exercise. Even though more
homophily would probably lead to more discrimination (in-group bias) “for any given matching
institution”, letting agents decide about their match (moving from exogenous to endogenous
matching) decreases aggregate discrimination. In particular, letting agents be in control of their
own economic relations has two opposite effects on social structure and economic outcomes:
the degree of segregation (measured by the share of in-group interactions) will increase due
to homophily but, at the same time, social discrimination (measured by in-group bias) may
decrease due to a combination of self selection and changed individual behavior. Hence self-
selected segregation need not necessarily be detrimental to the level of pro-social behaviour in
a society and need not increase discrimination. While one should be clear that there is a big
gap between the minimal design in this experiment and the complex life outside the lab, the
minimal design has allowed us to uncover a mechanism, which could potentially be of crucial
relevance for the assessment of policies that affect social and economic segregation.
Previous literature has documented homophily in several field studies. See e.g. Currarini
et al. (2009), Currarini et al. (2010), Centola (2011) or McPherson et al. (2001) for surveys
of the sociological literature. As already mentioned above this literature is mostly focused on
documenting homophily as a biased matching pattern, but has found it difficult to identify
the sources of homophily. To our knowledge there are no systematic experimental studies on
homophily yet.4
There has been much more experimental work on in-group bias. A number of papers in
psychological research have found evidence in support of in-group favoritism under a “minimal
paradigm” design, where the assignment of agents to groups is made with no reference to previous
interaction, correlation of preferences or pre-formed identities (see the pioneering work by Tajfel
and Turner (1979)). This has been confirmed in a recent study in experimental economics by
Chen and Li (2009), who have found in-group biases when agents are sorted in ad-hoc manner
into two groups labeled with colours (maize and blue). Our treatment EXO is closely related to
the “RandomBetween treatment” in the study by Chen and Li (2009) and our results from this
treatment are in line with their findings from their “RandomBetween treatment”. Other work
in experimental economics has not found biases in a truly minimal design (see Charness et al.
3Shifting the focus on risk attitudes as the primitive source of homophily requires some rationale for agents to
perceive in-group interaction as less uncertain. We discuss possible explanations in detail below.
4Experimental studies with endogenous group formation that are not directly measuring homophily are dis-
cussed below.
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(2007) in the context of prisoner’s dilemma and battle of sexes, Eckel and Grossman (2005) in
the context of team production and Chen and Chen (2011) in minimum effort games.). Strong
in-group biases have been found by Chen and Chen (2011), Charness et al. (2007) or Chakravarty
and Fonseca (2014) in designs that were not truly minimal. Ioannou et al. (2015) find in-group
biases only in settings where group identity is reinforced by displaying group payoffs. There is
also strong evidence of the role of priming in reinforcing identity-based behavior and preferences
(Benjamin et al. (2010), Van Bavel et al. (2008)).
Attempts to study in-group bias when the pattern of interaction is to some extent endogenous
include Foddy et al. (2009) who find that agents prefer to receive donations from in-group
members rather than from out-group members. They also show that this can be imputed to
the expectation of better treatment inside the group. Our experimental evidence only partially
confirms and points to a perceived reduction in uncertainty as a main motive for homophily (see
below). A number of papers have considered social dilemma games with an endogenous group
structure (Coricelli et al. (2004), Keser and van Winden (2000), Grimm and Mengel (2009)
and Ahn et al. (2009) among others). Since selection and exclusion - that are indeed found
to affect behaviour - are based on behavior rather than group membership or identity in these
studies, they are somewhat less related to our work. One study where selection and exclusion
are based on both behaviour and (possibly identity enhancing) team building tasks is Charness
et al. (2014). They allow for endogenous group formation in three stages involving expulsion,
voluntary exit and reformation in the context of a public good game. They find that endowments
are more important than the team-building task in determining segregation.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design in full detail.
Section 3 and 4 present the evidence homophily and in-group bias. Section 5 discusses the pos-
sible determinants for these phenomena, and for the decrease in in-group bias under endogenous
matching. Section 6 concludes.
2 Design
Our experiment was conducted at the BEE-Lab at Maastricht University between March-May
2011. 258 participants participated in one of our 5 main treatments. Our basic treatments are
treatments ENDO, EXO and CONTROL, which we describe next.
Treatment ENDO In treatment ENDO participants were first randomly and exogenously
allocated to the BLUE and RED group and informed about which group they belong to. Sub-
sequently the experiment developed as follows: First participants were asked whether they
preferred to be matched with a member of the RED or BLUE group. Subsequently (on a new
screen) their willingness to pay (wtp) for their choice was elicited. (Details on the elicitation
5
mechanism can be found below). They were then matched with a member of the RED or BLUE
group (with probabilities depending on their wtp) and informed about the group of their match
(RED or BLUE). Subsequently the two players in a given match were randomly allocated the
role of Player A and B (with equal probabilities) and played 8 games with their match in fixed
sequence.
First Mover (A) chooses Second Mover (B) chooses
G1 no choice (400,400) or (750,375) Altruism
G2 no choice (100,300) or (400,200) Altruism
G3 (250,250) or let B choose (100,100) or (500,100) Negative Reciprocity
G4 (50,650) or let B choose (0,100) or (100,100) Negative Reciprocity
G5 (500,0) or let B choose (300,300) or (600,275) Positive Reciprocity (Inequ. increasing)
G6 (250,0) or let B choose (100,100) or (250,50) Positive Reciprocity (Inequ. increasing)
G7 (350,100) or let B choose (300,300) or (100,350) Positive Reciprocity (Inequ. decreasing)
G8 (400,0) or let B choose (200,200) or (0,400) Positive Reciprocity (Inequ. decreasing)
Table 1: The 8 games. Payoffs are in format (piA, piB) where pii is the payoff of player i.
Table 1 describes the 8 games. They are variants of some of the games described in Charness
and Rabin (2002). In Games 1 and 2 there is no choice for Player A and Player B chooses between
two allocations. These games indicate how altruistically Player B behaves. In all other games
Player A moves first and either ends the game by picking an allocation or lets Player B choose,
who then chooses between two allocations. Games 3 and 4 indicate how negatively reciprocal
Player B behaves and Games 5-8 indicate how positively reciprocal Player B behaves. We
will sometimes distinguish between the cases where positive reciprocity is inequality decreasing
(Games 7 and 8) or increasing (Games 5 and 6). We can also distinguish whether altruism is
inequality decreasing (Game 1) or not (Game 2) and whether negative reciprocity is inequality
decreasing (Game 3) or increasing (Game 4).
Participants in the role of Player B were asked to make a conditional choice indicating what
they would do if player A decided to let them choose (strategy method). This means we observed
the choice of each participant in the role of Player B irrespective of what Player A did actually
choose. Hence even if there is little variation in player A’s behaviour or if player A’s behaviour
is very different across treatments, we get a full set of observations from player B. Participants
did not receive feedback about each other’s choices until all eight games had been played. This
implies that each participant can be treated as an independent observation in all the games.
Treatment EXO Our second treatment (EXO) coincides with ENDO except for the fact
that participants were randomly and exogenously matched with either someone from the RED
or BLUE group to play the 8 games. Comparing behaviour in EXO and ENDO enables us to
understand the connection between homophily (which can manifest itself only under endogenous
matching) and in-group biases at the population level.
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CONTROL In our CONTROL condition participants were randomly matched to play the
8 games, but there were no RED or BLUE groups in this treatment.5 The control condition
allows us to see how behaviour is affected by the introduction of groups. Understanding how
the creation of these artificial differences among our participants affects behaviour has relevant
implications regarding the role of heterogeneity within a society.
Those are our main treatments that we will use to understand homophily and in-group bias.
Let us briefly define these two key notions, that we will discuss in more detail later.
Homophily As we mentioned before, by homophily we will refer to a preference for interacting
with agents from the same group. Most of the time, we will measure homophily by the willingness
to pay for an in-group match (and heterophily as the wtp for an out-group match). It is important
to note, though, that participants faced two subsequent screens. On the first, they express a
non-incentivized preference for RED or BLUE and only on the second screen they are asked for
their wtp. We will use the second measure as a robustness check for some results. Given our
design, more homophily (in the sense defined above) will lead to a higher expected number of
in-group matches in the ENDO treatment.
In-group Bias By in-group bias we will refer to differences in choices in the eight games
across in- and out-group matches, which we will measure by the behavior of player B.
Additional Treatments We conducted two additional treatments to understand the reasons
behind homophily. Both LOWB and COORD coincide with ENDO, but the 8 games were
different in each case. In LOWB games were such that there is no scope for in-group biases. In
other words in LOWB there are no strategic reasons to be homophilous and hence we consider
the amount of homophily observed in this treatment a lower bound. In COORD, however,
games were such that being from the same group could potentially help to resolve coordination
problems. Hence we expected there to be more homophily in COORD compared to ENDO
compared to LOWB. Understanding where ENDO lies in the range between LOWB and COORD
can help us understand to which extent homophily is strategic. Sample Games from these
treatments can be found in Appendix G. Table 2 summarizes the treatment structure together
with the number of (independent) observations per treatment.6
5Sample Instructions for treatments ENDO, EXO and CONTROL can be found in the Appendix.
654 additional participants participated in two more treatments LABEL and FIXED. The design and some
results of treatment LABEL can be found in the Appendix. The results of treatment FIXED will be used for
another study and are available upon request. Other than the treatments reported we did not run any additional
sessions or treatments, nor did we conduct pilot studies.
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Label Matching Minimal groups Games Participants Role B
T1 ENDO endogenous yes SocialPreferences 67 40
T2 EXO exogenous yes SocialPreferences 73 40
T3 CONTROL exogenous no SocialPreferences 44 25
T4 LOWB endogenous yes No Scope for Bias 38 -
T5 COORD endogenous yes Coordination 36 -
Table 2: Main Treatments with number of participants.
Mechanism to elicit wtp We use the following mechanism to elicit the wtp of participants
in treatments ENDO, LOWB and COORD. Participants are endowed with 500 ECU at the
beginning of the experiment. This endowment was not given to them in connection with the
elicitation of their wtp. To elicit their wtp they are asked to state a number between 0 and 100
that indicates how much they would be willing to pay to be matched with their preferred group.
We then draw a random number between 0 and 100 from a uniform distribution. If the randomly
drawn number exceeded the number stated by the participant they were matched randomly.
Otherwise they were matched with their preferred group and an amount corresponding to their
number was deducted from their endowment.7 Since we had a finite number of participants in
the experiment, there was a small chance that this mechanism is infeasible. In this case (which
didn’t happen) we would have matched participants randomly and not deducted anything from
their endowment. Participants were fully informed about all these details (see Instructions in
Appendix D).
Our mechanism is essentially a first-price version of the well known Becker-deGroot-Marschak
(BDM) mechanism. The latter has recently been criticized for being too complex to understand
for participants and hence possibly leading to distorted decisions (Cason and Plott (2014)).8
Since in the first-price version the price that participants state is also the price they pay, the
first-price version is closer to everyday experience of most participants. We, hence, hoped that
the first-price version might be easier for participants. In addition to the wtp elicited in this
manner we also have the non-incentivized binary preference for in- and out-group matches (see
paragraph “Homophily”).
Minimal Group Design The design we used to induce in- and out- groups is called the near-
minimal group paradigm in social psychology (See e.g. Tajfel and Turner (1979)). According to
the near-minimal group design non-overlapping groups are created using trivial and sometimes
7Participants under this mechanism should maximize wtp
100
∗ (uIN −uOUT −wtp)+(1− wtp100 )(uIN−uOUT2 ), where
uIN is the utility derived from an in-group match and uOUT the utility they derive from an out-group match.
Assuming that uIN > uOUT , the interior optimum is to bid wtp =
uIN−uOUT
4
. If uIN = uOUT , the optimum is
to bid zero and if uIN < uOUT ,the optimum is to bid wtp =
uOUT−uIN
4
for an out-group match.
8See also Plott and Zeiler (2005) and the failed replication by Fehr et al. (2015). Earlier research has questioned
the incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism pointing out its dependence on the independence axiom (Karni
and Safra, 1987), its failure under Non-EU preferences (Horowitz, 2006) and circular validation issues when relying
on such mechanisms more generally (Guala, 2000).
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meaningless tasks. Group membership has to be anonymous and no social interaction (face-
to-face or computer-mediated chat) should take place between subjects. Summarizing 15 years
of sociological research Tajfel and Turner (1986) conclude that “the trivial, ad-hoc intergroup
categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group”. Chen and
Li (2009) have compared ad-hoc categorization according to two colours (maize and blue) with
categorization according to expressed preferences for paintings by different artists in an economic
experiment. They found that both procedures lead to significant in-group biases, while there are
no significant effects of the procedure on either size or direction of in-group biases. In our study
we used colours RED and BLUE as group labels to avoid hierarchical labels (such as group 1
and 2 or group A and B) and to avoid that labels are correlated with things we can’t control
for (such as stereotypes regarding gender, race etc.).
Many studies have shown that expectations about positive and negative reciprocity vary
greatly between different cultures and across genders and there are interaction effects between
the two as well. See e.g. Gaechter and Herrmann (2009) or Bohnet et al. (2010). Hence to be
sure that the wtp for in-group matches captures homophily and not e.g. differing expectations
across dimensions such as gender, culture etc.., it is important to use neutral groups. If we used
non-neutral groups (such as e.g. gender), then we couldn’t be sure that what we call homophily
does not simply reflect a gender stereotype. Of course in reality gender- and other stereotypes
might well create homophily. In this study, however, we want to focus on deeply rooted culturally
learned preferences for in-group matches, which are activated even for meaningless labels such
as RED and BLUE. In a sense we will measure the component of homophily that is common to
all dimensions (race, gender, social status etc.) in which homophily will manifest itself outside
the lab. In the instructions we also alternated between “RED and BLUE” and “BLUE and
RED” to avoid creating a hierarchy between the groups. We also test whether the color affects
behavior per se and find that generally it doesn’t (see Appendix B.3).
The abstract minimal group environment is certainly less rich than the natural environment
in the field. However, as we have outlined in Section 1, most existing studies in this literature
suffer from the problem, that their environment is “too rich” to disentangle different sources for
homophily and in-group biases. We will see below that our very stylized setting will help us to
identify clear links between these phenomena.
Other Details We used the experimental software z-tree by Fischbacher (2007) and the re-
cruitment system Orsee by Greiner (2004). Participants were paid the sum of payoffs obtained
in all games (with an exchange rate 1 Euro=500 ECU), a show up fee of 2 Euros as well as (in
treatments ENDO, LOWB and COORD) whatever remained from their initial endowment of
500 ECU. In some of the sessions a participant in the role of Player A was matched to two par-
ticipants in the role of player B. This was done because of low show-up. In this case participants
9
Figure 1: 72 percent of participants prefer an in-group match according to stated preferences.
47 percent are strictly homophilous, 43 percent neutral and 10 percent strictly heterophilous
according to the elicited wtp. The distribution of wtp for in-group matches first-order stochas-
tically dominates that for out-group matches (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0.0001).
in the role of Player A only received feedback and payments from one of their matches which was
randomly selected. At the end of the experiment participants filled in a questionnaire where we
elicited their risk aversion and a measure of cognitive ability and asked for their gender, age and
nationality.9 Details on these descriptive statistics in our sample can be found in Appendix A,
where also randomization checks based on these observables can be found. Each session lasted
between 30min (CONTROL) - 70min (ENDO) and participants earned on average 13,40 with a
minimum of 5,70 and a maximum of 24,60 Euros.
3 Homophily
We start by assessing how prevalent homophily is in our experiment. To these ends, we define
three types of agents, based on their declared willingness to pay and on the type of preferred
match. Strictly homophilous agents are those with a strictly positive willingness to pay for an
in-group match; Strictly heterophilous agents have a strictly positive willingness to pay for an
out-group match; and Neutral agents have a willingness to pay of zero.
Figure 1 shows the share of these types in the population. The left-most bar in figure 1(a)
measures the share of agents that declared to prefer an in-group match, including those who
afterwards declared a willingness to pay of zero. The three right bars in Figure 1(b) show the
percentages of strictly homophilous, neutral and strictly heterophilous participants in ENDO.
There are about 45% of strictly homophilous agents, about the same proportion of neutral
9We also posted an independent questionnaire on Amazon Mechanical Turk to get additional evidence on the
correlation between risk aversion and homophily. More details about this questionnaire are found in Sections 5
and C.3.
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agents, and only few strictly heterophilous agents that make up for about 10% of the population.
Figure 1(b) shows the distribution (cdfs) of wtp for in-group and out-group matches, respectively,
conditioning on those agents with a weak preference for the respective type of match. It can be
seen that the distribution of wtp for in-group matches dominates that for out-group matches in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
The average wtp computed as the average of all agents who stated to prefer an in-group or
out-group match (including neutral agents) is 13.86 for in-group matches and 4.23 for out-group
matches. Among strictly homophilous agents the average wtp for an in-group match is 29.03
and among strictly heterophilous agents it is 23.06.10 In Appendix B we also compute the ex
post optimal bid for an agent who perfectly anticipates in-group biases (discussed extensively
in Section 4). We find that this bid is ≈ 23. Hence, while many participants put in zero bids,
resulting in underbidding on average, those who display homophily overbid by about 6 units.
This could possibly be because they anticipate stronger in-group biases than there are or because
the bidding we observe is largely non-strategic.
Having assessed the presence of substantial homophily in our experimental setting, our aim
is to use our controlled environment to better understand what the sources of homophily in
social behaviour are. One natural conjecture is that agents prefer to match with similar others
because they strategically anticipate potential favourable in-group biases in the interaction to
follow, i.e. higher payoffs in in-group matches compared to out-group matches. This conjecture
views homophily as driven by in-group bias, through agents’ anticipation of potential gains.
To test this conjecture, we compare our main treatment ENDO to treatments LOWB and
COORD. In LOWB, strategic interaction is such that players cannot favour or discriminate
others on grounds of group membership. In other words, in LOWB there is no scope for in-
group bias. In COORD, instead, there are clear incentives for in-group matching (sample games
from treatments LOWB and COORD can be found in Appendix G). Where ENDO stands with
respect to these treatments helps us understand to what extent homophily in ENDO is driven
by expected game payoffs. Comparing ENDO and LOWB we record almost no difference in
average wtp, which is even slightly higher in LOWB, and exactly the same percentage of strictly
homophilous agents (see Figure 2). In contrast, behaviour in treatment COORD significantly
differs from that in both ENDO and LOWB, both in terms of the average wtp and in terms
of the percentage of agents with a strict preference for an in-group match (two-sided ranksum
test, p < 0.0019 and p < 0.0581, respectively). This evidence suggests that while agents do
respond for when they face explicit incentives to bid for in-group matches (as in COORD), the
homophily we observe in ENDO is not strategic in that it is not driven by the anticipation
10The entire distribution of the wtp in treatment ENDO as a bar chart can be found in Figure 8 in Appendix
B. Note that the distribution of the wtp for an in-group match is not truncated at zero, since agents can pay up
to 100 for an out-group match, i.e. to avoid an in-group match. A t-test of the one-sided hypothesis that this
(non-truncated) wtp > 0 returns a p-value of 0.0035.
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Figure 2: Comparison of wtp across treatments ENDO, LOWB and COORD. In all treatments
bids are significantly different from zero in in-group, but not out-group matches. Bids for an
in-group match are statistically indistinguishable in ENDO and LOWB (two-sided ranksum
test, p > 0.4), and significantly higher in COORD compared to either (two-sided ranksum test,
p < 0.0019).
of more favorable treatment in in-groups (or in-group bias). As we will see in Section 4 any
expectation of substantial in-group bias would be misguided, since, as it turns out, in-group
biases are statistically no different from zero in ENDO.
Result 1: Homophily in a minimal design
• There are about 45% of strictly homophilous agents, 45% neutral agents, and 10%
strictly heterophilous agents in the ENDO treatment.
• Homophily is not a matter of opportunities and is not driven by the anticipation of
in-group biases in the social preference games.
We will discuss possible alternative explanations for homophily in ENDO in Section 5. Some
of our discussion there will be based on the relation between in-group bias and homophily, and
on how in-group bias and discrimination are affected by the matching institution. These topics
are covered in detail in the next section.
4 In-Group Bias and the Role of the Matching Institution
We start by giving a descriptive overview of behaviour in the 8 social preferences games, then
define our measure of in-group bias, and present our evidence for the EXO and ENDO treat-
ments. Descriptive Statistics on all main variables used in the following can be found in Table
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EXO ENDO EXO ENDO
A A B B
G1 − − 0.30 0.29
− − (0.37, 0.23) (0.31, 0.27)
G2 − − 0.15 0.28
− − (0.23, 0.06) (0.26, 0.30)
G3 0.49 0.26 0.37 0.35
(0.53, 0.44) (0.24, 0.29) (0.18, 0.61) (0.43, 0.26)
G4 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.18
(0.70, 0.50) (0.59, 0.69) (0.18, 0.55) (0.23, 0.15)
G5 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.38
(0.36, 0.32) (0.62, 0.08) (0.50, 0.12) (0.44, 0.30)
G6 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.20
(0.30, 0.19) (0.62, 0.15) (0.37, 0.08) (0.29, 0.18)
G7 0.16 0.30 0.65 0.65
(0.24, 0.07) (0.54, 0.08) (0.69, 0.62) (0.59, 0.70)
G8 0.05 0.15 0.82 0.72
(0.08, 0.00) (0.24, 0.08) (0.91, 0.72) (0.85, 0.67)
Table 3: Overview of behaviour in treatments EXO and ENDO. Percentages in A columnns
indicate the frequency with which player A moves “In”, i.e. lets Player B choose. Percentages
in B columns indicate the mean frequency with which Player B chooses the altruistic (G1-G2),
negatively reciprocal (G3-G4) or positively reciprocal (G5-G8) options, respectively. Numbers
in brackets indicate the mean frequency in in- and out-group matches.
11 in Appendix A (questionnaire variables) and Table 12 in Appendix B (main experimental
variables).
A first look at Table 3 suggests that there are not many differences in average behaviour of
Player B between ENDO and EXO. However, there seem to be consistently higher differences
between in- and out-group behaviour in treatment EXO compared to treatment ENDO. For
player A we find differences also in means: Player A’s seem to be somewhat more willing to let
Player B choose in ENDO (compared to EXO) in positive reciprocity games and less willing in
negative reciprocity games. Below we will try to uncover some of the mechanisms behind these
numbers.
We define in-group bias as the difference in behaviour of player B between in-group and out-
group matches. We focus on Player B in measuring in-group bias since in-/out-group differences
in the behaviour of Player A could be due not only to a genuine tendency to discriminate
between groups (which the notion of in-group bias aims to capture), but also to the (strategic)
anticipation of differential behaviour by Player B in in/out-group matches. Player B, by contrast,
moves last and has therefore no such strategic reasons, and any behaviour differences for player
B are clean evidence of in-group biases.
Since our design does not rely on the strategy method, all participants play the games either
in an in-group situation or in an out-group situation. One advantage is that our design is not
leading, since it avoids conditional choices of the type “if I was matched within the “RED” group
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I would do this, otherwise I would do that”. Such contingent choices might be seen as suggestive,
i.e. participants might expect that they should choose differently just because a difference is
made by the experimenter.11 The downside of our design is that for any given sample size we
will have fewer observations in each situation and that we can’t directly observe in-group bias at
the individual level.12 So, in measuring in-group bias we will compare the behaviour of different
participants in in-group and in out-group matches.
4.1 In-Group Bias with Exogenous Matching
We start with treatment EXO, where agents have no way of affecting their matching probabilities.
Table 4 shows the results of simple logit regressions where a binary variable, indicating whether
a participant in the role of player B displayed altruistic, negatively or positively reciprocal
behavior is regressed on another binary variable that indicates whether behaviour took place in
an in-group match (variable “in-group”). We clustered standard errors by individual, since we
observed each participant in two games for each category. Remember the categories are altruism
(games 1,2), negative reciprocity (3,4), positive reciprocity (inequality increasing case 5,6) and
positive reciprocity (inequality decreasing 7,8).13
We find that there is significantly less negative reciprocity in in-group compared to out-group
matches (column (2) in Table 4) and more positive reciprocity in Games 5-6 (where positive
reciprocity is inequality increasing) (column (3) in Table 4). In particular there is a 34 percent
increase in positive reciprocity and a 40 percent decrease in negative reciprocity in in-group
matches according to the marginal effects of the logit regression below. (See also figure 3).
Those results are consistent with Chen and Li (2009) who, with a within subject design, find a
19 percent increase in positive reciprocity and a 13 percent decrease in negative reciprocity in
in-group compared to out-group matches. If anything, the in-group biases we find are slightly
stronger. This is consistent with evidence from e.g. political science, where it has been found
that people tend to suppress discriminatory tendencies when directly confronted with multiple
options ((Kuklinski et al., 1997)).
Table 5 shows the same regression except that we included additional variables from the
11Of course the opposite might also occur and participants might suppress discriminatory tendencies when
directly confronted with conditional choices (Kuklinski et al., 1997).
12Between subject designs also always rely on the assumption that there is no selection (e.g. on social prefer-
ences) into the different treatments. Randomization checks in Appendix A show that there was no selection on
age, gender, nationality or risk aversion.
13Since we will pool the two games in each category in the following let us have a brief look at within-pair
consistency. The conditional probability to choose the altruistic option in G2 conditional on having done so in G1
is 0.84 in ENDO and 0.80 in EXO. The conditional probability to choose negatively reciprocal in G4 conditional
on having done so in G3 is 0.98 in ENDO and 0.92 in EXO. The probability to choose positively reciprocal in G6
conditional on having done so in G5 is 0.78 in ENDO and 0.83 in EXO. And, finally, the probability to choose
positively reciprocal in G8 conditional on having done so in G7 is 0.88 in ENDO and 0.97 in EXO. Individual
behaviour is hence reasonably stable across the two games in each category.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
G1-G2 G3-G4 G5-G6 G7-G8
Altruism Neg. Recp Pos. Recp (i) Pos. Recp (d)
in-group 0.956 -1.841*** 2.123** 0.665
(0.651) (0.562) (0.839) (0.589)
Constant -1.825*** 0.336 -2.398*** 0.693*
(0.557) (0.441) (0.781) (0.400)
Groups 40 40 40 40
Observations 80 80 80 80
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: In-group Bias in EXO. Logit Regression. 40 individuals (groups) in the role of Player
B, 80 observations. Standard errors clustered by id. 53 percent of all matches were in-group
matches. ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10% significance.
EXO G1-G2 G3-G4 G5-G6 G7-G8
(“Altruism”) (“Neg. Recp”) (“Pos.Recp.(I)”) (“Pos.Recp.(d)”)
constant −8.137∗∗ 1.995 −9.746∗∗ 8.944∗
(3.741) (4.498) (4.395) (5.029)
in-group 1.816∗∗ −1.572∗∗∗ 2.141∗∗∗ 1.008
(0.785) (0.605) (0.807) (0.748)
age 0.069 −0.117 0.288∗ −0.315
(0.164) (0.187) (0.173) (0.212)
gender −1.100 0.500 −0.019 −1.706∗
(0.697) (0.655) (0.694) (0.904)
RED 2.063∗ −0.590 0.208 −0.465
(0.917) (0.625) (0.625) (0.672)
risk aversion 0.591∗∗ 0.221 −0.038 0.265
(0.240) (0.273) (0.252) (0.246)
cognitive reflection 0.902∗∗ 0.054 0.593∗ −0.527
(0.350) (0.287) (0.320) (0.395)
Groups 39 39 39 39
Observations 78 78 78 78
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: In-group Bias in EXO. Logit Regression with additional variables (Standard errors
clustered by id). 39 individuals (groups) in the role of Player B, 78 observations. One individual
dropped who preferred not to answer gender/age question in questionnaire. 53 percent of all
matches were in-group matches. ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10% significance.
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questionnaire as well as a dummy “RED” that takes the value 1 for participants from the RED
group to see whether colour matters per se. The questionnaire variables are age, a gender
dummy (1=female), a measure of risk aversion and a measure of cognitive reflection. All the
variables are described in detail in Appendix C.
The main message is that in-group biases identified in Games 3-4 and 5-6 remain significant
when these variables are introduced and the coefficients are of about the same size. In fact
statistical significance is even higher for positive reciprocity when controlling for these variables
(G5-G6). Interestingly a new in-group bias appears for the category Altruism (Games 1-2) when
controlling for these variables. Participants are more altruistic towards in-group members. In
addition, it seems that more risk averse, more cognitively reflected people and people from the
RED group are more altruistic. We have no convincing explanation for why more cognitively
reflected participants might be more altruistic.14 However none of these variables can robustly
explain behavior in any of the other game categories. The single most important variable is the
in-group dummy.
4.2 In-Group Bias with Endogenous Matching
We next measure in-group bias in treatment ENDO with endogenous matching. Our main result
here is that when agents choose who to match with, the aggregate in-group bias either diminishes
or totally vanishes in statistical terms. This is illustrated in Figure 3, depicting in-group bias
in both treatments EXO and ENDO, for the different pairs of games.
One important issue in comparing the EXO and ENDO treatments is that in the latter,
whether or not a person ends up in an in-group match is not exogenous to behavior. In particular,
the same characteristic that leads an agent to show differential behavior across in-group and out-
group matches may affect that agent’s preference over who to be matched with.15 In Appendix
B we reproduce the equivalent of Tables 4 and 5 for treatment ENDO, but because of the
endogeneity issue discussed these tables should be read with care. In addition, to control for
the willingness to pay, and therefore isolate the effect of a match’s type on behavior, we have
included the variable “wtp × in-group” in some of the logit regressions reported in Table 13 in
Appendix B. The right column for each of the pairs of games shows coefficients where the wtp
variable is omitted. We find that, irrespective of whether we control for wtp × in-group or not,
14Dual process theory sometimes maintains that looking for self-interest is an automated and primed response,
while understanding one’s ethical obligations to others is a more conscious and reflective process (Moore and
Loewenstein (2004)). This could explain why more cognitively reflected participants are more altruistic. Indeed,
there is some experimental evidence that delayed/slower decisions imply less negative reciprocity (Grimm and
Mengel (2011); Oechssler et al. (2015)) and more altruism (Piovesan and Wengstroem (2009)) and sometimes also
cooperative behaviour (Rand et al. (2012)), even though the latter has not been put in doubt by Tinghoeg et al.
(2013) or Recalde et al. (2014). Since we only find the effect for altruism and since the link between cognitive
reflection and response times seems less than clear (Grossman et al. (2014); Recalde et al. (2014)), we do not
want to push this interpretation too much.
15As we will show below, this is indeed the case. “Homophilous” agents do behave differently from others.
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Figure 3: In-Group Biases. The graph shows the difference in the percentages of B-players
displaying “altruism” (Games 1-2), “negative reciprocity” (Games 3-4), “positive reciprocity”
(inequality increasing (Games 5-6)) or “positive reciprocity” (inequality decreasing (Games 7-
8)) between in-group matches and out-group matches. On the left hand side is ENDO and
on the right hand side is EXO. ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10% significantly different from zero (minimum
significance level across Tables 4, 5, 13 , 14 or 6).
the coefficients on in-group are not significant. The exception is a marginally significant positive
bias for games 5 and 6 (positive reciprocity), which disappears once we control for wtp.
Table 14 in Appendix B shows the results of the same regression as the base regressions in
Table 13, but again we have included some variables from the questionnaire. In this regression
as well we do not find any significant in-group biases for treatment ENDO. The marginally
significant coefficient on in-group in Games 5-6 disappears here and instead in-group appears
as marginally significant in Games 3-4. Taken together there is no evidence for robust in-group
biases in ENDO.
Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients from a Spearman correlation test, where we corre-
late behaviour with the binary variable “in-group”. This table illustrates that biases (correlation
coefficients) are uniformly larger in EXO compared to ENDO (in terms of their absolute value)
and are only statistically significant in EXO, with the exception of a marginally significant co-
efficient for Games 5 and 6 (positive reciprocity) in ENDO. Again, the evidence from the table
confirms previous analysis: there is little evidence of in-group bias in ENDO.
ENDO EXO
Altruism (Games 1-2) −0.0314 0.2728∗
Neg. Reciprocity (Games 3-4) 0.2363 −0.4551∗∗∗
Pos. Reciprocity (I) (Games 5-6) 0.3103∗ 0.5392∗∗∗
Pos. Reciprocity (d) (Games 7-8) 0.0205 0.1870
Table 6: Spearman correlation coefficients. Correlation between the frequency of altruistic,
negatively reciprocal etc.. behavior and in-group match dummy. 40 individuals in the role of
Player B, 80 observations. ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%.
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4.3 Selection
We need to be careful in interpreting the reduction of in-group bias from EXO to ENDO in
terms of a change in individual behaviour. Because of self-selection, homophilous (heterophilous)
agents tend to interact in in-group matches more (less) frequently in ENDO than in EXO. But
can this self-selection of types alone explain the observed change in in-group bias? Or can we
conclude that some shift in individual behaviour has happened as a result of the change in the
matching institution?
Let us first take a step back and note that while self selection may potentially drive the result,
the direction in which it operates is not obvious. If homophilous agents, for example, displayed
more reciprocity in both in- and out-group matches compared to non-homophilous agents, then
we would necessarily have an increase in in-group biases as more homophilous agents assemble
in in-groups in ENDO compared to EXO. If, however, homophilous agents were less reciprocal
in all matches compared to others, we would have a decrease in the bias from EXO to ENDO
etc. Hence, it is not sufficient to observe the direction of the bias to rule out self-selection as
the unique cause of the decline in in-group bias.
Figure 4: Levels of reciprocity in ENDO (by type of matching preference) and in EXO. Re-
member that 45 percent of agents are classified as homophilous and neutral, respectively and 10
percent as heterophilous.
To do so we have to answer two questions: (i) are there possible realizations of the matching
process that can produce the observed bias in EXO when holding contingent behavior in ENDO
for all three types constant? and (ii) is contingent behavior in in-group and out-group matches
significantly different between ENDO and EXO? We answer these questions separately for the
case of negative and positive reciprocity. Note that by doing so we are testing a weaker hypoth-
esis, since it is the same realization of the matching process that has to produce both the bias
in negative and positive reciprocity. We start with the case of negative reciprocity illustrated in
Figure 4(a).
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Negative Reciprocity For all types, negative reciprocity is weakly higher in in-group matches
compared to out-group matches in ENDO. At the same time, in the EXO treatment we observed
significantly less negative reciprocity at the aggregate level in in-group compared to out-group
matches . Furthermore, in ENDO all types are more negatively reciprocal in in-group matches
compared to average behavior in in-group matches in EXO (one-sided ranksum test p < 0.07).
And all types are less negatively reciprocal in out-group matches in ENDO compared to average
behavior in out-group matches in EXO (one-sided ranksum test p < 0.01). Hence, even allowing
for any distribution of types, there is no realization of the matching process that could have
produced this outcome without a shift in behavior.
Positive Reciprocity The case of positive reciprocity is illustrated in Figure 4(b). Here we
see that all types are more positively reciprocal in out-group matches in ENDO compared to
EXO (one-sided ranksum test p < 0.06).16 This implies that again there is no realization of
the matching process in EXO that may have generated the observed average level of reciprocity,
clearly demonstrating that self-selection alone cannot explain the changes in aggregate behaviour
we observe by moving from exogenous to endogenous matching.
We can now summarise the main insights we have obtained in this section about the role of
the matching institution for in-group biases.
Result 2: In-group bias and the matching institution
• Aggregate in-group biases vanish or decrease in the transition from exogenous to en-
dogenous matching.
• Self selection alone cannot explain the change in in-group bias from exogenous to
endogenous matching, and a shift in behaviour due to the change in the matching
institution must have occurred.
4.4 Homophily, Discrimination and the Matching Institution
A somewhat provoking implication of the above results is that providing social actors with greater
control on their interaction patterns would decrease discrimination, as behavioural differences
between in-group and out-group matches would, on average, vanish. So, while on the one hand
endogenizing matches has the effect of increasing the degree of segregation of social contacts,
on the other hand it may mitigate the degree of discrimination in social interaction through
the joint effect of self selection and of the shift in behaviour describe above. Two observations,
16We can also conduct this test separately for all types and find significance levels of p = 0.0929 (strictly
homophilous) and p = 0.0656 (neutral) for the one-sided test, but no significance for heterophilous agents due to
their small number.
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and caveats, are in order here. First, due to the design of our experiment, the decrease in
discrimination does not refer to a change in the behaviour that the same agent adopts in different
types of matches, but rather to the change in the behaviour that is observed, in aggregate, in
society in different types of matches. Second, the fall in discrimination mainly comes from an
increase in the punishment adopted in in-group matches and not, as one may expect or even
wish, from an increase in positive reciprocity or even altruism towards out-group opponents.
A related but conceptually different issue is whether increases in homophily would affect
the degree of discrimination for a given fixed matching institution and, if so, in what direction.
Figure 5 shows in-group biases separately for the three different types of matching preferences
in negative and positive reciprocity games (3-4 and 5-6, respectively). In the positive reciprocity
games, we record a significant and positive in-group bias only for homophilous agents, while no
bias is present on average for neutral and heterophilous agents. No significant bias is present
in negative reciprocity games. The type of bias we find in the positive reciprocity games is of
the type one would naturally expect: agents that prefer to match with similar agents, are also
prone to reward similar others in return for kind actions; by the same logic agents that prefer to
match with dissimilar others would be expected to reward similar agents less. We find evidence
for both intuitions, although only in the case of homophilous agents the effect is statistically
significant.
Figure 5: In treatment ENDO in-group biases are only found when restricting to homophilous
agents. Stars indicate significance level according to two-sided ranksum test comparing in- and
out-group matches ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%. effect sizes are as follows: strictly homophilous: 0.17
in G3-G4, 0.42∗∗ (G5-G6); neutral: 0.11 (G3-G4), 0.19 (G5-G6); heterophilous: 0.25 (G3-G4),
−0.31 (G5-G6). As a robustness check we also do this analysis for stated preferences only and
find the following effect sizes: weakly homophilous 0.18∗ (G3-G4), 0.48∗∗∗ (G5-G6); weakly
heterophilous 0.07 (G3-G4), −0.114 (G5-G6).
Result 3 Under endogenous matching, in-group biases can be found only among homophilous
agents, who are more positively reciprocal towards the in-group than towards the out-group.
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5 Discussion
5.1 On the Sources of Homophily
Within our minimal design, homophily is certainly not a matter of opportunities or stereotypes.
Agents meet according to a matching process which is in all respects anonymous except for group
membership (RED or BLUE) and the way in which agents affect probabilities according to their
declared wtp; likewise, the way in which agents are assigned to the BLUE and RED group is
independent of any individual characteristic of participants. In Section 3 we have also seen that
in our minimal design homophily is not driven by the strategic reaction to the anticipation of
in-group biases. Hence we can rule out all of these as possible channels behind homophily in our
experiment. In this section we develop and discuss some (evidence-based) conjectures on what
the roots of homophily might be, and relate them to the results of the previous section.
We start by reporting the results from the post experimental questionnaire in which we
elicited risk aversion of participants. As a measure of risk aversion we use a variable that counts
in how many Holt-Laury style lottery choice questions in the questionnaire the participants
preferred a sure outcome to a non-degenerate lottery.17 The questions can be found in Appendix
C.1. The variable ranges from 0 (least risk averse) to 7 (most risk averse). It should be noted
that this is a non-incentivized measure. Table 7 shows the distributions of the variable risk
aversion in treatments ENDO and EXO, which are remarkably similar (see also Figure 7 in
Appendix A).
ENDO EXO
0 (least risk averse) 0.10 0.10
1 0.07 0.08
2 0.29 0.21
3 0.31 0.34
4 0.18 0.17
5 0.02 0.05
6 0 0
7 (most risk averse) 0 0.01
Table 7: Distribution of the variable Risk aversion.
Participants with a higher willingness to pay for an in-group match are more risk averse
(Spearman test ρ = 0.3586∗∗∗). Figure 6 (left panel) illustrates the predicted values of a linear
regression, where we explain the wtp for an in-group match via the risk aversion variable, as well
as data points in risk aversion - wtp space. The figure omits strictly heterophilous agents and
displays fitted lines from two regressions - one without and one with a square term. Clearly, the
wtp for an in-group match seems to increase with an agent’s risk aversion.
17Since all the lotteries were presented to participants on the same page and ordered according to the implied
CRRA range, we observe very few instances (less than 1%) of multiple switching.
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Figure 6: Data points and fitted values from a linear OLS regression of the wtp for an in-group
match on risk-aversion in treatment ENDO (left panel) and in the AMT study (right panel).
We also conducted a cognitive reflection test in the questionnaire and found no significant
correlation between cognitive reflection and a binary measure of homophily nor between cognitive
reflection and willingness to pay. Table 8 shows OLS regressions, where we regress the wtp for
homophilous agents on all our questionnaire variables. It can be seen that the only variable that
is significant is the degree of risk aversion of the participant. We run three different regressions
where we control for different sets of questionnaire variables. The estimated coefficient on our
risk aversion variable is pretty stable across all these.
(1) (2) (3)
constant 9.766 0.4308 8.0820
(42.376) (11.828) (9.517)
age 0.121
(1.925)
gender −9.022
(11.450)
risk aversion 7.863∗ 9.6014∗∗ 8.8207∗∗
(4.382) (3.612) (3.549)
cognitive reflection 2.918 4.4167
(4.688) (4.076)
observations(groups) 32 32 32
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Homophily (wtp) . OLS Regression of wtp on questionnaire variables for 32 homophilous
participants in ENDO. ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10% significance.
Result 4 Homophily is positively correlated with risk aversion.
To get some independent evidence of this correlation we posted a questionnaire on Amazon
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Mechanical Turk (AMT) in January 2014.18 We asked participants a simple question about
their risk preferences, namely “How willing are you in general to take risks”? This question has
been found to explain risky behavior, such as holdings stocks, smoking and occupational choices
better than other standard measures of risk aversion (Dohmen et al. (2011)). We use the answer
to this question (on a scale from 0,...,7) to explain respondents’ homophily, which we measure
with two questions: (i) How strongly do you prefer to “mix with your own kind”? and (ii) How
strongly do you prefer to interact with people similar to you? also ranging from 0,...,7. The
spearman correlation coefficient between these measures is ρ = 0.3119∗∗, amazingly close to the
one found in our experiment. Figure 6 (right panel) illustrates the distribution of data points
and the linear regression found in column (2) of Table 9. Column (1) also controls for gender
and age of our AMT respondents.
(1) (2)
constant 3.538∗∗∗ 3.057∗∗∗
(1.045) (0.601)
age −0.024
(0.027)
gender 0.645
(0.645)
risk aversion 0.355∗∗ 0.352∗∗
(0.159) (0.152)
observations(groups) 42 42
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: OLS Regression of homophily indicator on risk aversion, gender and age in our AMT
questionnaire with 42 respondents. ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10% significance.
This evidence points to a possible psychological source of homophily. Suppose agents per-
ceived the behavior of similar agents to be more predictable (for reasons to be discussed below).
Those who are more risk averse would end up investing more in relationships with similar others
(by declaring a higher wtp), in which they expect ex-ante less strategic uncertainty. Interestingly,
an interpretation based on risk aversion as the primitive force behind homophily is consistent
with the recent sociological theory that explains group identification as a reflection of agents’
desire to decrease their perceived uncertainty over the outcome of social interaction (Hogg and
Abrams (1993), Hogg (2000)). Perceptions and beliefs also play a role in recent theories in
Economics on the emergence of homophily (see e.g. Kets and Sandroni (2014)).19
But why should agents believe to better predict behavior in in-group matches? One possible
18The full questionnaire and details about our respondents and Amazon Mechanical Turk can be found in
Appendix C.3.
19Compare with the search based theory of Currarini and Vega-Redondo (2011) and the explanation based on
social preferences by Chen and Chen (2011).
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explanation is that agents expect in-group interaction to be regulated by behaviors that stabilize
outcomes on some implicit norm. Such behaviors may take the form of harsh punishments
of bad behavior from in-group opponents, possibly grounded in the psychological distress of
having invested resources (wtp) in vain, or in a reaction to unexpected ill treatment from other
agents from the same group. It is not uncommon in reality to see in-group members being
punished more harshly than out-group members for a given behaviour. Through self selection,
risk averse agents tend to cluster in in-group matches, forming disjoint close-knit communities
within cultural groups. Such communities tend to be characterized by strong social norms, which
are enforced by means of selective punishments and rewards. Phenomena such as the punishing
of acting white behavior which refers to a person’s perceived betrayal of identity can be viewed
as instances of such effects.20,21
5.2 The Effect of the Introduction of Groups
Before we conclude we have a brief look at our CONTROL condition where agents played the
same 8 games as in EXO and ENDO, but where no mention was made of different groups.
Understanding how behaviour in EXO differs from CONTROL can help understand how the
introduction of artificial group differences or identities affects behavior.
EXO in-group EXO out-group CONTROL p-value
EXO vs CONTROL
G1-G2 0.30 0.13 0.22 p = 0.6511
G3-G4 0.18 0.58 0.26 p = 0.3321
G5-G6 0.43 0.08 0.30 p = 0.8316
G7-G8 0.79 0.66 0.74 p = 0.9817
Table 10: Comparison of Behavior EXO and CONTROL (Means). p-values from two-sided
ranksum tests.
Table 10 shows the result of this comparison. In all four categories of games behavior in
CONTROL lies in between average behaviour in in- and out-groups in EXO. This shows that
- at least in our setting - the introduction of different identities does not lead to substantially
different behaviour on average. An exception is the case of negative reciprocity (games 3-4),
where behaviour in the CONTROL condition is much closer to in-group behavior in EXO and
significantly different from out-group behavior in EXO (p < 0.05). Hence the introduction of
artificial identities leads to a loss in welfare (i) due to an increase in negative reciprocity as well
20It is reasonable to assume, of course, that such heuristics are learned in real groups outside the laboratory
and triggered in the unfamiliar situation encountered in the laboratory.
21Figure 3 shows that, indeed, there might be more negative reciprocity in in-group matches compared to out-
group matches in ENDO, even though the effect is not significant. Consistently with more negative reciprocity,
player A opts out, i.e. does not let player B choose, more often in in-group matches (56 percent of the time)
compared to out-group matches (46 percent) in ENDO (see Appendix B.2). Again, this difference is not significant,
however.
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as (ii) due to discrimination (different behaviour in in- and out-group matches) in our case. This
is true only, as our previous results have shown, under exogenous matching conditions.
6 Conclusions
We proposed a minimal design to study homophily in the laboratory and found evidence for
homophily in such a design even in the absence of stereotypes, differing opportunities or the
strategic anticipation of preferential treatment by others. We further studied the connection
between homophily and in-group bias. We found that they are tightly linked: giving homophily
a playing field (by allowing for endogenous matching) significantly reduces in-group biases.
Furthermore in-group biases are only found among agents that are also homophilous. We also
found that risk aversion is strongly correlated with homophily in two independent samples.
These results should be of interest to any social scientist studying discrimination, segregation
and the like. They also have implications for a number of important policy dimensions, especially
for situations where matching is an issue. Those include matching workers into teams, children
to schools or social workers or field agents to different neighborhoods. Our results show that
allowing some degree of choice in who to work with, can reduce in-group biases and hence
discrimination at the work place. Our results have also shown, though, that whether or not
discrimination will be reduced depends on the incentives (whether or not there is scope for
positive, negative reciprocity etc.). In addition, of course, other factor that were blended out
in this experiment, need to be considered as well, such as information asymmetries between
different groups or complementarities in skills etc. The interaction of such effects with the
parameters considered in this experiment should be understood in future research.
Future research, both in the lab and in the field, is also needed to understand the sources
of homophily and the reasons why in-group biases decrease with homophily at work through
endogenous matching. One direction for this research could lie in the theory brought forward
in this article which is based on two assumptions: In-group interactions among homophilous
agents obey behavioral norms and deviations from these norms are harshly punished (hence the
reduction in in-group bias). Secondly, these norms (seem to) make behavior in in-group matches
more predictable, hence providing a motive for risk averse agents to be homophilous.
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A Appendix: Sample Characteristics and Randomization Checks
In this section we describe some of the characteristics of our sample and conduct report random-
ization checks based on five observables: age, gender, nationality, risk attitude and a measure of
cognitive reflection. The variable gender takes the value 1 for female and zero for male. The vari-
able nationality was elicited in 9 categories (1=german/dutch; 2= western europe (non-german,
non-dutch); 3= eastern europe; 4=north america; 5= south america; 6= east asia; 7=south asia;
8=africa; 0=others). The variables risk aversion and cognitive reflection are described in detail
in Appendix C.
Figure 7: CDF’s of age, nationality, risk aversion index and cognitive reflection index for the
two samples in ENDO and EXO.
Figure 7 shows the cdf’s of four of these (gender is binary) for both treatments ENDO and
EXO. It can be seen that the distribution of age, nationality and our risk aversion index are
roughly similar across the two treatments EXO and ENDO. There seem to be somewhat more
very little reflected participants (score 0) in ENDO as opposed to EXO.
Table 11 shows the mean and standard deviation of these variables in ENDO and EXO as
well as randomization checks using OLS and two-sided ranksum tests. The table shows that the
differences in means tend to be small and the distributions not significantly different according
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ENDO EXO two-sided
mean SD mean SD ∆ENDO−EXO OLS ranksum test
age 21.71 9.69 21.66 15.53 0.05 p = 0.351 p = 0.3868
gender 0.671 0.50 0.575 0.52 0.094 p = 0.271 p = 0.2597
nationality 2.805 1.99 3 2.10 - 0.195 p = 0.577 p = 0.6269
risk aversion 2.477 1.25 2.630 1.42 - 0.153 p = 0.506 p = 0.5131
cognitive reflection 1.402 1.142 1.712 1.111 - 0.310 p = 0.107 p = 0.1065
Table 11: Observable Sample Characteristics and Randomization Checks.
to either test. The cognitive reflection measure stands out a bit, with participants in ENDO
being somewhat less cognitively reflected. The difference in distributions is not statistically
significant, but the p-values quite close to the 10 percent level. We have seen in Sections 4 and
5, though, that cognitive reflection does not predict wtp nor behaviour in games 3-8. Hence,
even if there are differences between the two samples in terms of cognitive reflection, they do
not seem to explain our experimental results (with respect to wtp (homophily) and behaviour
in games 3-8 (in-group bias)).
32
B Appendix: Additional Tables and Results
B.1 Additional Tables and Results Sections 3-5
This section collects additional results and tables. Table 12 shows descriptive statistics (mean
and SD) for our main experimental variables.
CONTROL EXO ENDO
IN OUT IN OUT
Altruism 0.22 (0.38) 0.29 (0.33) 0.13 (0.28) 0.26 (0.38) 0.27 (0.34)
Neg Recp 0.26 (0.35) 0.18 (0.24) 0.58 (0.46) 0.38 (0.41) 0.20 (0.34)
Pos Recp (I) 0.30 (0.25) 0.43 (0.35) 0.08 (0.25) 0.46 (0.43) 0.21 (0.31)
Pos Recp (d) 0.74 (0.35) 0.79 (0.33) 0.66 (0.38) 0.69 (0.38) 0.68 (0.34)
wtp (IN) - - - 13.86 (23.56)
wtp (OUT) - - - 4.23 (11.53)
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics (Mean (SD)) of experimental variables across treatments EXO,
ENDO, in- and out-group matches and the control condition.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the variable wtp. It peaks at zero, reflecting the relatively
high percentage of neutral agents. There are few heterophilous agents, whose wtp ranges from
0 to 50 and many more homophilous agents whose wtp ranges from 0 to 100. We next ask how
much of homophily observed can be rationalized by the anticipation of in-group biases.
Figure 8: The distribution of willingness to pay in treatment ENDO. Negative Numbers indicate
wtp for an out-group match and positive numbers wtp for an in-group match. Bin width is 10.
Ex post empirical optimality of bids How much should one be willing to pay for an in-
group match if one could anticipate the choices of the population perfectly? We start with player
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type A and we assume standard preferences. In treatment ENDO player type A does not face
significantly different treatment in G1-G2 by player B, in G3-G4 anticipating player B’s choices
would make player A opt for “OUT” in in-group matches resulting in a payoff of 250 and for
“In” in out-group matches resulting in an expected payoff of 272, an expected loss of 22. In
games G5-G6 player A would stay out in both in- and out-group matches, implying no payoff
difference in these games. For player type B again there would be no differences in G1-G4, since
in none of these games player A behaviour differs across in- and out-group matches (see Section
B.2 right below). In G5-G6 the expected gain is 104 and in G7-G8 the expected gain is 101.
Given that participants do not know yet when they indicate their wtp whether they will be type
A or type B (and both are equally likely), the expected gain from playing in an in-group match
is 12 ∗ (−22) + 12 ∗ 205 ≈ 92. Given our mechanism to elicit wtp players should maximize
max
wtp
100
∗ (92− wtp) +
(
1− wtp
100
)
∗ 92
2
(1)
which implies a choice of wtp = 23.
Table 13 reproduces the regression in Table 4 for treatment ENDO. It should be noted,
however, that in ENDO this regression has endogenity issues due to precisely the endogenous
selection into in-group matches. Table 14 reproduces Table 5 from the main text for treatment
ENDO with the same caveat.
G1-G2 G1-G2 G3-G4 G3-G4
constant −0.9555∗∗∗ −1.3332∗∗∗ −1.3633∗∗∗ −1.3633∗∗
in-group −0.2615 −0.0430 0.9167 0.8933
wtp x in-group 0.0094 −0.0011
groups 40 40 40 40
observations 80 80 80 80
G5-G6 G5-G6 G7-G8 G7-G8
constant −1.3633∗∗∗ −1.3633∗∗∗ 0.7777∗∗ 0.7777∗∗
in-group 0.9375 1.2091∗ 0.6442 0.0332
wtp x in-group 0.0134∗∗ −0.0239
groups 40 40 40 40
observations 80 80 80 80
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Logit Regression with standard errors clustered by id. In-group Bias in ENDO. 40
individuals (groups) in the role of Player B, 80 observations. 62 percent of all matches were
in-group matches. ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%.
Table 15 compares how much more positively or negatively reciprocal participants of different
types (homophilous, neutral or heterophilous) are in in-group matches compared to out-group
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ENDO G1-G2 G3-G4 G5-G6 G7-G8
(“Altruism”) (“Neg. Recp”) (“Pos.Recp.(I)”) (“Pos.Recp.(d)”)
constant −2.364∗∗ −1.174∗∗ −0.538 −0.151
(0.746) (0.383) (3.149) (2.685)
in-group −0.190 1.429∗ 0.663 0.307
(0.746) (0.838) (0.700) (0.734)
age 0.140 0.044 −0.015 0.034
(0.151) (0.148) (0.137) (0.114)
gender −0.913 0.483 −0.123 0.123
(0.779) (0.629) (0.641) (0.636)
RED 0.285 −0.794 0.927 −0.505
(0.748) (0.929) (0.778) (0.671)
risk aversion −0.313 −0.206 −0.149 0.171
(0.289) (0.308) (0.318) (0.311)
cognitive reflection −0.305 −0.106 −0.242 −0.087
(0.245) (0.273) (0.324) (0.239)
groups 40 40 40 40
observations 80 80 80 80
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: In-group Bias in ENDO. Logit Regression with additional variables (Standard errors
clustered by id). 40 individuals (groups) in the role of Player B, 80 observations. 62 percent of
all matches were in-group matches. ∗∗∗1%,∗∗5%,∗10% significance.
matches.
Homophilous WTP=0 Heterophilous
Neg. Reciprocity (Games 3-4) 0.3158 0.0558 0.3043
Pos. Reciprocity (Games 5-6) 0.5190∗∗ 0.1484 -0.6667
Number of Observations (Share) 18(45%) 17(43%) 5(12%)
Table 15: Spearman correlation coefficients. Correlation between the frequency of altruistic,
negatively reciprocal etc.. behavior and in-group match dummy. 40 individuals in the role of
Player B, 80 observations. ∗∗∗ 1%,∗∗ 5%,∗ 10%
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B.2 Appendix: Behavior Player Role A
This section is devoted to understanding the behaviour of participants in the role of player
A. Player A’s decision to let Player B decide or not can be motivated by (i) concerns on the
distribution of payoffs (such as efficiency, equality etc.) and (ii) by anticipation of Player B’s
behaviour. If a participant in the role of Player A lets Player B choose in Game 3, then we
can reasonably interpret this to mean that s/he does not expect B to be negatively reciprocal.
If s/he lets Player B choose in Games 7-8, then we can interpret this to mean that s/he does
expect Player B to be positively reciprocal. In Games 4,5 or 6 a case could be made that Player
A may let B choose because this will be inequality reducing. This makes player A’s behaviour
more difficult to interpret in terms of in-group bias, which is why we have focused on Player B’s
decision for the main part of the paper.
Games 3 and 4 - Negative Reciprocity There are no significant differences between in-
and out-group matches in terms of the behavior of Player A in ENDO, where 56 percent and
46 percent of them, respectively, decide not to let player B make a choice (the difference is
marginally significant for game 3 alone). There is also no significant difference between in- and
out-group matches in EXO, where 38 percent and 53 percent respectively decide not to let player
B make a choice. The difference between ENDO and EXO is marginally significant for in-group
matches and insignificant for out-group matches.
Games 5 and 6 - Positive Reciprocity In ENDO there are strong and significant differences
between in-group and out-group matches. In out-group matches only about 10 percent of agents
let Player B choose, while in in-group matches 62 percent let Player B choose (p = 0.0010). In
treatment EXO there are no significant differences between in- and out-group matches with 33
percent and 25 percent respectively letting Player B choose.
Games 7 and 8 - Positive Reciprocity In ENDO only 7 percent of agents let Player B
choose in out-group matches, while 38 percent let Player B choose in in-group matches. The
difference is significant (p = 0.0273). In treatment EXO 3 percent let Player B choose in out-
group matches, while 14 percent let Player B choose in in-group matches. This difference is not
significant.
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B.3 Appendix: Effect of Group Labels
This subsection presents some results regarding the effect of group labels. We first ask whether
people have a higher willingness to pay to play with a RED rather than the BLUE group. The
average willingness to pay to play with the RED group is 20.41 in ENDO and the average w.t.p
to play with BLUE is 19.77. The two are not significantly different according to a Mann-Whitney
test. We then ask whether behavior is affected by being in a RED or BLUE group per se.
red blue
Altruism 0.23 0.15
Neg. Rec. (Games 3-4) 0.32 0.32
Pos. Rec. (Games 5-6) 0.35 0.16
Pos. Rec. (Games 7-8) 0.67 0.76
Table 16: Colours don’t matter per se. ENDO
red blue
Altruism 0.23 0.12
Neg. Rec. (Games 3-4) 0.31 0.43
Pos. Rec. (Games 5-6) 0.29 0.28
Pos. Rec. (Games 7-8) 0.71 0.73
Table 17: Colours don’t matter per se. EXO
There are no significant differences between blue and red players in either of the treatments
and for any of the games with the exception of Altruism in treatment EXO. The colour of the
group does not seem to matter per se.
B.4 Appendix: Sample Games LOWB and COORD
Tables 18 and 19 show sample games from treatments LOWB and COORD.
X Y
X 0,0 200,200
Y 200,200 0,0
Table 18: Game 1 in treatment LOWB
In treatment LOWB, players played a series of pure (anti-) coordination games where players
have to choose different actions to reach the good payoffs. There is no possibility for a player
to favor an in-group opponent here by choosing either X or Y.
In treatment COORD players played the same games as in LOWB. However, actions here
are labeled by group labels RED or BLUE, in such a way that - if players choose the action that
corresponds to their group label - players of the same group will manage to coordinate while
players of different groups won’t.
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BLUE RED
RED 0,0 200,200
BLUE 200,200 0,0
Table 19: Game 1 in treatment COORD
B.5 Appendix: Additional Treatment LABEL
This section collects some additional results from our treatment LABEL. This treatment coin-
cides with ENDO, but we labeled the actions in the 8 games by either RED or BLUE to see
whether such labels can induce different norms of behaviour in the two groups and whether such
norms could possibly crowd out existing norms of behaviour. Our evidence shows that this was
not the case.
red blue
prefer in-group 0.65 0.65
wtp in-group 14.4 12.41
wtp out-group 0.75 6.58
Table 20: Percentage of red and blue participants preferring an in-group match, as well as
average willingness to pay for a in-group or out-group match in Period 1.
None of the differences between red and blue participants are significant (Mann-Whitney,
p > 0.7267). However there is a higher willingness to pay for a in-group than for a out-group
match across all participants (Mann-Whitney, all periods, p = 0.0092).
red blue
Altruism 0.20 0.30
Neg. Recip. 0.25 0.30
Pos. Recip. 0.30 0.37
Ant. PosR 0.15 0.18
Ant. PosR 0.15 0.18
Table 21: Are labels followed? Altruistic and Reciprocal Behavior by Red and Blue participants
as well as Anticipation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity (Player A) if the match is blue/red.
The table shows that labels are not followed. Red participants are not more altruistic or
reciprocal than blue participants. (None of the differences are significant).
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C Appendix: Questionnaire
We first report the questions asked in the questionnaire and then describe the variables derived
from it.
C.1 Appendix: Questions
• General Questions with multiple options to tick.
– What is your nationality?
– What is your gender?
– What is your age?
– What is your field of study?
• Cognitive Reflection Test
– A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euros in total. The bat costs 1 Euro more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
– If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
– In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake?
• Risk Aversion
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 10 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 20 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 30 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 40 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
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– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 50 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 60 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
– If you had the choice between throwing a coin and receiving 100 Euros if heads comes
up and 0 Euros if tails come up or a deal where you get 70 Euros for sure which would
you prefer?
C.2 Appendix: Overview Variables
Table 22 shows some summary statistics of the questionnaire variables used in the regressions
in the main text.
interpretation range EXO mean EXO range ENDO mean ENDO
risk aversion 7 most risk averse, 0 least [0,7] 2.63 [0,5] 2.48
gender 1= female , 0=male [0,1] 0.55 [0,1] 0.65
age [18,25] 21.71 [18,29] 21.66
cognitive reflection number of correct answers [0,3] 1.71 [0,3] 1.40
Table 22: Questionnaire Variables used in Regressions in the main text.
C.3 Appendix: AMT questionnaire
AMT is an online labor market in which employers can employ workers to complete short
tasks (generally less than 10 minutes) for relatively small amounts of money (generally less
than 1 US dollar). One major advantage of AMT is it allows experimenters to easily expand
beyond the college student convenience samples typical of most economic game experiments.
Among American subjects, AMT subjects have been shown to be significantly more nationally
representative than college student samples (Buhrmester et al. (2011)). Running experiments
online necessarily involves some loss of control, since the workers cannot be directly monitored as
in the traditional lab; hence, experimenters cannot be certain that each observation is the result
of a single person (as opposed to multiple people making joint decisions at the same computer).
Moreover, although the sample of subjects in AMT experiments is more diverse than samples
using college undergraduates, we are obviously restricted to people that participate in online
labor markets. To address these potential concerns, recent studies have explored the validity
of data gathered using AMT (for an overview, see Rand (2012)). Suri and Watts (2011), e.g.,
find quantitative agreement in contribution behavior in a repeated public goods game between
experiments conducted in the physical lab and those conducted using AMT with approximately
40
10-fold lower stakes (see also Horton et al. (2011)). It has also been shown that AMT subjects
display a level of test-retest reliability similar to what is seen in the traditional lab on measures
of political beliefs, self-esteem, Social Dominance Orientation, and Big-Five personality traits
(Buhrmester et al. (2011)) as well as belief in God, age, gender, education level and income (Rand
(2012)). Hence we are confident that our measures obtained on AMT are at least somewhat
representative. The following questions were asked in our AMT questionnaire.
• What is your age?
• What is your gender?
• What is your highest level of education?
• What is your income?
• How willing are you to take risk in general?
• How strongly do you prefer to “mix with your own kind?
• How strongly do you prefer to interact with people similar to you?
In addition we also asked them the same lottery choices as we did in the questionnaire of
our experiment. The variables used in Section 5 are summarized in the Table below.
interpretation range mean
risk aversion 7 most risk averse, 0 least [0,6] 3.38
homophily indicator 7 most homophilous, 0 least [0,7] 4.33
gender 1= female , 0=male [0,1] 0.57
age [20,67] 35.64
Table 23: Questionnaire Variables AMT Questionnaire used in Section 5.
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D Appendix: Sample Instructions
D.1 ENDO
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions care-
fully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this exper-
iment. If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come
to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other participants is not
allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have to exclude you from the
experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment.
For your participation you will receive 2 Euros. During the experiment you can earn more.
How much depends on your behavior and the behavior of the other participants. During the
experiment we will use ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and at the end we will pay you
in Euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro =500 ECU. All your decisions will be treated
confidentially.
These instructions are exactly the same for all participants in the room.
THE EXPERIMENT
Phase 1: The RED and BLUE groups
At the beginning of the experiment each participant receives an endowment of 500 ECU.
All participants in this room are randomly assigned to one of two groups, the BLUE group
and the RED group. Once the software starts you will be informed about which group you
belong to.
Phase 2: Your choice of who to interact with
In Phase 3 of the Experiment that we describe below you will interact in a number of games.
Before that - in Phase 2 - you can state a preference for whom to interact with. In particular
you can first state a preference for whether you would like to interact with someone from the
RED or BLUE group.
Afterwards you will see a new screen. If you have previously stated that you would like to
interact with someone from a particular group (either BLUE or RED), then you will have the
possibility to increase the chances that you will actually be matched with someone from that
group on the third screen.
You can increase your chances to be matched with someone from your desired group as
follows:
First you will indicate a number between 0 and 100 that indicates how much you would be
willing to pay to be matched with your preferred group that you indicated on Screen 2. We will
draw a random number between 0 and 100 (where all numbers have the same probability). If our
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number is smaller than your number, you will be matched for sure with your preferred group.
In this case an amount corresponding to your number will be deducted from your endowment.
If our number is larger than your number you will be matched randomly with a member of
either group. Example: Here is an example of how the procedure works: Assume you indicate
the number 21 and we draw randomly the number 46. Then since 46 > 21 you will be matched
randomly with someone from either the RED or the BLUE group. However if e.g. you indicate
83 and we draw randomly the number 16, then since 83 > 16 you will be matched with the
group you prefer. However, in this case your endowment will be reduced by 83 (the number that
you stated).
Hence the higher the number you state, the more likely it is that you will be matched with
your desired group. On the other hand your endowment is also reduced by more if you state a
higher number. There is a small probability that it is not feasible to match everyone with their
desired group (e.g. if everyone states 100). If this is the case you will be randomly matched and
your endowment will not be reduced.
Phase 3: The Games
In Phase 3 you will play the following 8 games together with an interaction partner. Whether
your interaction partner will be from the BLUE or RED group will depend on your choices in
Phase 2. Before Phase 3 begins you will be informed about which group your interaction partner
belongs to. Similarly your interaction partner will be informed about which group you belong
to.
Here is a list of all 8 games you will play. You will play each game exactly once. Before the
games begin either you or your interaction partner will be randomly determined to be Player
A. If you are not Player A then you will be Player B in all 8 games. Whether you or your
interaction partner will be Player A is fully independent of your or your interaction partner’s
group.
1. Game 1: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (400,400) meaning that each player
gets 400 or (750,375) meaning that Player B gets 375 and Player A 750.
2. Game 2: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (100,300) meaning that player A gets
100 and Player B 300 or (400,200) meaning that Player A gets 400 and Player B 200.
3. Game 3: Player A chooses between two options. (250,250) meaning that each player gets
250 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose between (100,100)
meaning that each player gets 100 and (500,100) meaning that player A gets 500 and player
B gets 100.
4. Game 4: Player A chooses between two options. (50,650) meaning that player A gets 50
and player B 650 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
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between (0,100) meaning that A gets nothing and B gets 100 and (100,100) meaning that
each player gets 100.
5. Game 5: Player A chooses between two options. (500,0) meaning that player A gets 500
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (600,275) meaning that player
A gets 600 and player B gets 275.
6. Game 6: Player A chooses between two options. (250,0) meaning that player A gets 250
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (100,100) meaning that each player gets 100 and (250,50) meaning that player A
gets 250 and player B gets 50.
7. Game 7: Player A chooses between two options. (350,100) meaning that player A gets
350 and player B gets 100 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can
choose between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (100,350) meaning that
player A gets 100 and player B gets 350.
8. Game 8: Player A chooses between two options. (400,0) meaning that player A gets 400
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (200,200) meaning that each player gets 200 and (0,400) meaning that player A
gets 0 and player B gets 400.
It is important to note that you won’t get any feedback about what your interaction partner
chose until the last game has been played.
Phase 4: A post-experimental Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire to be filled in which will
take about 5 minutes.
Summary
1. First you will be informed about which group (RED or BLUE) you belong to.
2. You can state a preference for being matched with someone of the BLUE or RED group
and you can increase your chances of being matched with someone of that group via the
procedure explained above.
3. You will play the 8 games described above with your interaction partner. Whether your
interaction partner is from the RED or BLUE group will depend on your choices in Step
2.
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4. There will be a short questionnaire at the end.
Enjoy the Experiment!
D.2 EXO
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions care-
fully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this exper-
iment. If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come
to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other participants is not
allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have to exclude you from the
experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment.
For your participation you will receive 2 Euros. During the experiment you can earn more.
How much depends on your behavior and the behavior of the other participants. During the
experiment we will use ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and at the end we will pay you
in Euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro =500 ECU. All your decisions will be treated
confidentially.
These instructions are exactly the same for all participants in the room.
THE EXPERIMENT
Phase 1: The RED and BLUE groups
All participants in this room are randomly assigned to one of two groups, the BLUE group
and the RED group. Once the software starts you will be informed about which group you
belong to.
Phase 2: Your match
In Phase 2 of the Experiment you will be randomly matched with an interaction partner
from either the RED or BLUE group to play the games we will describe below.
Phase 3: The Games
Before the start of Phase 3 you will be informed about whether your interaction partner is
from the BLUE or RED group. Similarly your interaction partner will be informed about which
group you belong to.
Here is a list of all 8 games you will play. You will play each game exactly once. Before the
games begin either you or your interaction partner will be randomly determined to be Player
A. If you are not Player A then you will be Player B in all 8 games. Whether you or your
interaction partner will be Player A is fully independent of your or your interaction partner’s
group.
45
1. Game 1: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (400,400) meaning that each player
gets 400 or (750,375) meaning that Player B gets 375 and Player A 750.
2. Game 2: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (100,300) meaning that player A gets
100 and Player B 300 or (400,200) meaning that Player A gets 400 and Player B 200.
3. Game 3: Player A chooses between two options. (250,250) meaning that each player gets
250 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose between (100,100)
meaning that each player gets 100 and (500,100) meaning that player A gets 500 and player
B gets 100.
4. Game 4: Player A chooses between two options. (50,650) meaning that player A gets 50
and player B 650 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (0,100) meaning that A gets nothing and B gets 100 and (100,100) meaning that
each player gets 100.
5. Game 5: Player A chooses between two options. (500,0) meaning that player A gets 500
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (600,275) meaning that player
A gets 600 and player B gets 275.
6. Game 6: Player A chooses between two options. (250,0) meaning that player A gets 250
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (100,100) meaning that each player gets 100 and (250,50) meaning that player A
gets 250 and player B gets 50.
7. Game 7: Player A chooses between two options. (350,100) meaning that player A gets
350 and player B gets 100 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can
choose between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (100,350) meaning that
player A gets 100 and player B gets 350.
8. Game 8: Player A chooses between two options. (400,0) meaning that player A gets 400
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (200,200) meaning that each player gets 200 and (0,400) meaning that player A
gets 0 and player B gets 400.
It is important to note that you won’t get any feedback about what your interaction partner
chose until the last game has been played.
Phase 4: A post-experimental Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire to be filled in which will
take about 5 minutes.
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Summary
1. First you will be informed about which group (RED or BLUE) you belong to.
2. You will be matched with someone of the BLUE or RED group.
3. You will play the 8 games described above with your interaction partner. Whether your
interaction partner is from the RED or BLUE group will be determined in Step 2.
4. There will be a short questionnaire at the end.
Enjoy the Experiment!
D.3 CONTROL
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions care-
fully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this exper-
iment. If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come
to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other participants is not
allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have to exclude you from the
experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment.
For your participation you will receive 2 Euros. During the experiment you can earn more.
How much depends on your behavior and the behavior of the other participants. During the
experiment we will use ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and at the end we will pay you
in Euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro =500 ECU. All your decisions will be treated
confidentially.
These instructions are exactly the same for all participants in the room.
THE EXPERIMENT
In the experiment you will play 8 games with another randomly selected participant. Here
is a list of all 8 games you will play. You will play each game exactly once. Before the games
begin either you or your interaction partner will be randomly determined to be Player A. If you
are not Player A then you will be Player B in all 8 games. Whether you or your interaction
partner will be Player A is fully independent of your or your interaction partner’s group.
1. Game 1: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (400,400) meaning that each player
gets 400 or (750,375) meaning that Player B gets 375 and Player A 750.
2. Game 2: Player B chooses between two outcomes. (100,300) meaning that player A gets
100 and Player B 300 or (400,200) meaning that Player A gets 400 and Player B 200.
47
3. Game 3: Player A chooses between two options. (250,250) meaning that each player gets
250 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose between (100,100)
meaning that each player gets 100 and (500,100) meaning that player A gets 500 and player
B gets 100.
4. Game 4: Player A chooses between two options. (50,650) meaning that player A gets 50
and player B 650 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (0,100) meaning that A gets nothing and B gets 100 and (100,100) meaning that
each player gets 100.
5. Game 5: Player A chooses between two options. (500,0) meaning that player A gets 500
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (600,275) meaning that player
A gets 600 and player B gets 275.
6. Game 6: Player A chooses between two options. (250,0) meaning that player A gets 250
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (100,100) meaning that each player gets 100 and (250,50) meaning that player A
gets 250 and player B gets 50.
7. Game 7: Player A chooses between two options. (350,100) meaning that player A gets
350 and player B gets 100 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can
choose between (300,300) meaning that each player gets 300 and (100,350) meaning that
player A gets 100 and player B gets 350.
8. Game 8: Player A chooses between two options. (400,0) meaning that player A gets 400
and player B gets 0 or s/he lets player B choose. If s/he lets B choose then B can choose
between (200,200) meaning that each player gets 200 and (0,400) meaning that player A
gets 0 and player B gets 400.
It is important to note that you won’t get any feedback about what your interaction partner
chose until the last game has been played.
A post-experimental Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire to be filled in which will
take about 5 minutes.
Enjoy the Experiment!
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